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 The historical backdrop of state sovereignty is portrayed by a consistent condition of 
progress. The inherent principles of sovereignty as enshrined in the treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648, such as the non-intervention, territorial integrity, and absolute power within 
the bounds of a state border, have been re-assessed over a long period of time in light of 
new difficulties to guarantee that they stay applicable to the needs of any given time. 
The very embodiment of sovereignty has constantly undergoes changes and 
adjustments to cope of with period of difficulties, ranging from the battle for minority 
rights to mixture of issues identifying with the new trendy expression of human rights 
and the obligation to maintain international peace and security. This paper, therefore, 
argues that contemporary states are showing a more prominent willingness to 
acknowledge compromises on matters of sovereignty in quest for a more effective 
counterterrorism motivation. States do not appear to be attaching an infinite value to 
sovereignty; yet rather consider it within the setting of broader national interest. In this 
way, the degree to which states effectively protect their sovereign prerogatives is 
subject to the same system as all other state decisions: the cost-benefit analysis. States 
measure the costs and benefits of any given policy or action and utilize the outcome as 
an aide for decision-making. In the present period, changing state demeanors with 
respect to sovereignty and counterterrorism emerge from a shifting balance between 
costs and benefits in battling international terrorist groups. This evident with the 
establishment of a  Multinational Joint Task Force which allows cross-border military 
operations by neighboring countries thereby creating a paradigm shift from the 
traditional and rigid conception of sovereignty to a more flexible one. 
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 Taking after the horror and demolition brought 
about by the Second World War, the international 
community met up and consented to disallow the 
unilateral danger or utilization of force by states in 
order to make a world described by tranquil 
concurrence instead of hostility and violent clash. 
This new world order was revered in the Charter of 
the United Nations ("the Charter"). It was marked by 
fifty states in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and 
gave the premise to the international legal framework 
directing the utilization of force (Sarkin, 2010). 
 The United Nations ("UN") aggregate security 
framework does however give methods by which 
military force can be utilized to deliver dangers to 
international peace and security. This has not 
however constantly demonstrated successful because 
of the very politicized nature of the international 
framework and this has brought about military 
mediation being withheld despite the existence of 
gross act of inhumanity  or taken unlawfully outside 
of the international framework, neither of which is a 
satisfactory nor reasonable situation(Otto, 2010). 
 It has turned out to be increasingly obvious in 
the post-Cold War time that the international legal 
system controlling the utilization of force between 
states, as classified under  the UN Charter, is not able 
to react successfully to cutting edge threats to 
international peace and security including the across 
the board multiplication of progressively complex 
and dangerous substance, natural and atomic 
weapons, expansive scale infringement of human 
rights including law violations against humankind 
and genocide and the proliferation of well organize 
body of non-state actors such terrorist groups and 
militias that have continue to unleash violence both 
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at the national and international level(Hickman, 
2010). 
 The human rights discourse has accumulated 
significant pace in the course of recent years and it is 
presently generally acknowledged by the 
international community that sovereign states have 
an obligation to shield their citizens from gross 
human rights violations and subsequently to cease 
from executing such violations (Musifiky, 2010). 
The definition of a state sovereignty has apparently 
shifted far from an absolutist origination where the 
state is the sole controller of its internal affairs 
towards the one whereby the right to sovereign 
status, and the related rights of non-interference, is 
predicated upon the compelling undertaking of 
obligations expected of a state, as controlled by the 
international community, including securing of the 
fundamental human rights of its citizens as well as 
preventing the escalation of it domestic conflict 
(Hessler, 2010). 
 Where a state neglects to effectively performs  
its responsibilities the international community is 
obliged to respond by taking the fundamental steps, 
which might at last incorporate the utilization of 
military force, to avoid gross human rights 
infringement happening and to restore international 
peace and security (Newman,2009). Accordingly 
there exists an unmistakable tension between the 
doctrine of non-utilization of force against the 
citizens of sovereign states that is the doctrine of 
non-interference in states domestic affairs and the 
promotion and protection of human rights. This is a 
strain which has not been fully reconciled by the 
international community and this is reflected by the 
far reaching differences about, and criticism of, the 
present state of international law around this arena 
(Haskaj, 2008). 
 In light of the prior it is clear that the decision 
about whether to take military intervention against 
another state, or a non-state actor, is an exceptionally 
troublesome and complex one which incorporates a 
huge number of legal, political, financial, logistical 
and moral consideration for a state to say something 
the equalization when planning polices and settling 
on decisions about military intervention. This paper 
therefore try to provide an explanation of how the 
cross-border act of insurgency by non-state actors 
necessitate the collective use of military force which 
provide a clear departure from the traditional 
conception of a sovereignty as an absolute and rigid 
property of a state with an indivisible character both 
within and outside its boundary toward the concept 
of sovereignty which is so flexible that allows use of 
force by other states against the non-state actors from 
another country. 
 States apply sovereignty in the administration of 
national interests, for sovereignty is a component of 
the state. One of the more captivating contemporary 
crossing points between state sovereignty and 
national interest lies in the coliseum of counter-
terrorism (Sarkin, 2010). The significance of 
sovereignty for counter-terrorism has long been 
perceived, as states struggle against the constraints 
forced by sovereignty upon their capacity to beat the 
danger of international terrorism (Engene, 2007). Yet 
the mere fact that sovereignty has for quite a while 
ago constituted a stumbling block in the battle 
against terrorism does not imply that its role has not 
undergoes some evolution. In the course of recent 
decades, the rise of transnational terrorism has in a 
general sense upgraded the significance of 
sovereignty as an element in counter-terrorism 
(Hannes, 2011). 
 As a result, contemporary states must choose the 
option to re-examine the longstanding counter-
terrorism suppositions in light of new realities. In a 
few states, the procedure of reassessment may not 
create radical revisions in doctrine. Different states, 
in any case, will acknowledge the need of adjusting 
their use of sovereignty in counter-terrorism. The 
fundamental components pushing these revisions are 
not short lived. They are recently entrenched 
components of the international legal framework. It 
is therefore crucial to appreciate their importance in 





 This involve a “premeditated threatened or 
actual use of force or violence to attain a political 
goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation and when 
its ramifications transcend national boundaries 
through the nationality of the perpetrators and/or 
human or institutional victims, location of the 
incident, or mechanics of its resolution “(Batelson, 
2006). 
 
The concept of sovereignty: 
 State sovereignty has numerous dimensions. It 
can be characterized in the connection of any number 
of state interactions with individuals, political 
institutions, other states, or international institutions. 
A typical definition, be that as it may, interfaces the 
idea of sovereignty to the thought of authority. In this 
structure, the state of sovereignty presents absolute 
authority to a state as the declaration of the 
underlying political community (Buxbaum, 2009). 
Sovereignty along these lines secures practical 
importance as a marker of state primacy; the position 
of the state as the essential authority within its 
particular limits emanate from the sovereignty it 
wields. In addition, the absolute way of sovereign 
authority reaches out to the different indications of 
state force. Sovereignty is as much an issue of 
jurisdiction as influence (Franceschet, 2010). As 
states bargain their restrictive authority in matters of 
locale, they change the utilitarian reality they could 
call their own sovereignty. 
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 Sovereignty is made up of internal and external 
components. Internal sovereignty alludes to one side 
of a state to focus its domestic game plans without 
external interference (Sarkin, 2010). The protection 
of domestic political, social and economic 
settlements from outside interruption is as much a 
component of state sovereignty as the protection of 
physical territory. External sovereignty alludes to the 
legal status of the state as an individual from the 
international community (Ip, 2010). Sovereign states 
have a unique kind identity within the international 
framework, and sovereignty presents particular 
rights, benefits and obligations upon its proprietors. 
The respectability of sovereign possessions is held to 
be intact. Common articulations of appreciation for 
sovereignty support the system of associations that 
describe state conduct. Undoubtedly, it is the state of 
sovereignty that formally characterizes the limits of 
multi-state collaboration, paying little respect to 
standardizing conventions (Macklem, 2008). 
Sovereignty in this manner involves a double part, at 
the same time approving the internal authority of the 
state and differentiating the legitimate degree of its 
external self-governance. At its center, sovereignty is 
an idea of delineation. 
 States watch out for zealously secure the 
uprightness of their sovereignty, for reasons of policy 
- as a measure of governmental authority – and 
politics, since any apparent encroachment of 
sovereignty dangers starting an objection of 
nationalistic pride among the masses (Sarkin, 2010). 
Along these lines, generally, saving a greatest level 
of sovereignty adjusts to the national interests of 
states and the parochial interests of state 
governments. Yet this guideline uncovers an 
underlying rationale that is regularly disregarded. 
State sovereignty is a component of national interest. 
From the point of view of a given state, sovereignty 
is simply one element – though a profoundly special 
one – along a range of concerns. This is reflected in 
the regular advancement of state sovereignty 
throughout the hundreds of years. The premise of 
sovereignty extensively moved from dynastic 
personality in the eighteenth century to the structure 
of government in the nineteenth to the authenticity of 
national self-determination in the first 50% of the 
twentieth, even before present times (Okogbule, 
2008). In every occurrence – in fact, all through the 
advanced history of sovereignty – the shift in the 
paradigm of sovereignty emerged from the interests 
of states as much as their qualities. In this manner, 
while "generic" components, for example, changing 
thoughts of authenticity and international request 
assumed a part, so too did the "individual" elements 
of planned state aim, as specific interests constrained 
states to offer novel elucidations of sovereignty 
(Macklem, 2008). State interests are therefore, the 
foundation of the use of sovereignty. 
 Besides, the instrument for states to focus the 
relationship between sovereignty and national 
interest in any given connection is the excellent 
component of the rational actor: a computation of 
costs and benefits. States conduct steady 
reassessments they could call their own sovereignty, 
measuring the costs and benefits of rigidity against 
the costs and benefits of adaptable interpretation 
(Newman, 2009). While the equalization regularly 
falls in favor of rigidity, it is not extraordinary for 
state sovereignty to give way due to different 
concerns, as the advancement of the European Union 
intensely illustrates. The extent to which states 
defend their sovereign obligations bears consistent 
perception. This is especially valid in matters of 
counterterrorism. Traditionally, states tend to value 
law enforcement issues as the center of national 
obligations and safeguarding their authority as well 
(Hannes, 2011). Given the variety of interests on 
how counterterrorism is affecting security, politics, 
economics, and internal stability it is not hard to 
understand the motives for states to keep up total 
control over counterterrorism policy. 
 Since the signing of the peace treaty of 
Westphalia, the idea of human rights and the 
protection of citizens from one perspective and a 
state's supreme right to focus its internal affairs 
including the destiny of its citizens have made some 
amazing progress subsequent to the peace treaty of 
Westphalia. Gone are the days when a state could 
treat its citizens with complete negligence and 
legitimize its activities by holing up behind the so-
called concept of sovereignty and non-interference. 
In this contemporary world, a state must legitimize 
its activities to both its citizens and the international 
community (Hannes, 2011). 
 The historical backdrop of state sovereignty is 
portrayed by a consistent condition of progress. The 
inherent principles of sovereignty, for example, non-
intervention, territorial integrity, and absolute power 
within the bounds of a state border, have been re-
assessed over a long period of time in light of new 
difficulties to guarantee that they stay applicable to 
the needs of any given time. For constructivists, the 
very thought of sovereignty is a construct informed 
by amendable norms and values. Subsequently, the 
idea of sovereignty changes in response to the 
improvement of new norms in the international 
system: "Fundamental to constructivist translations 
of sovereignty is the perspective that sovereignty 
itself originates from ""somewhere"" and, in any age, 
is intensely affected by other social norms and 
practices (Hickman, 2010)." In light of this assertion, 
the very embodiment of sovereignty has constantly 
changed and adjusted even with difficulties, running 
from the battle for minority rights to mixture of 
issues identifying with the new trendy expression of 
human rights and the obligation to secure. Regardless 
of these difficulties, sovereignty has figured out how 
to stay pertinent and hearty by adjusting to new 
substances. For sovereignty to stay adaptable and 
flexible in an evolving world, states have needed to 
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give up control where essential and have been 
compelled to accept more prominent parts in 
different zones. With history as an aide, it is likely 
that the idea of sovereignty will keep on being made 
over either intentionally or be compelled to do as 
such so as to stay applicable in a changing and 
evolving world. 
 
The concept of sovereignty and Collective Security 
System: 
 The utilization of military force is lawful when it 
has been approved by the UNSC. The UNSC has the 
"essential obligation regarding the protection of 
international peace and security" (Article 24) and can 
approve the utilization of force (Article 42) where 
the presence of a threat to international peace and 
security has been confirmed (Otto, 2010). Threats to 
international peace and security can incorporate, yet 
are not constrained to, the utilization or threat of 
military force by one state against another, territorial 
or between state equipped clashes, philanthropic 
calamities which cause more extensive local 
destabilization, maybe as a consequence of displaced 
person streams, and gross human rights infringement 
submitted by a state against its people groups. All 
together for the utilization of force to be approved by 
the UNSC nine affirmative votes are obliged and the 
greater part of the permanent members must cease 
from practicing their veto. Both permanent and non-
perpetual individuals might likewise absent and this 
won't bring about the vote to fall flat if there are an 
adequate number of votes for the determination and 
no veto is exercised (Engene, 2007). 
 By centralizing the utilization of force within the 
collective security framework it was imagined that 
the inclination for international armed clash and 
violence by non-state actors would be enormously 
decreased yet in the meantime accommodate the 
utilization of military force when vital. Moreover, it 
was trusted that when such force was authorized it 
would have a high level of authenticity, having been 
sanction by the international group by means of the 
UNSC, and in this manner gather both good and 
military backing for the operation (Sarkin, 2010). 
 
The United Nations Security Council and the 
Protection of Human Rights: 
 Ruefully, the UNSC does not generally 
authorize the utilization of military force when it is 
required and necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. This is either in 
light of the fact that there are an inadequate number 
of votes for the resolution (an absence of political 
will) or, most usually, a permanent members 
activities or debilitates to practice its veto, as 
happened as of late when France's draft resolution 
approving limited military intervention in Syria was 
rejected by Russia (Hannes, 2013. This circumstance 
is known as "Security Council deadlock". The UNSC 
is an intrinsically political organ and shockingly its 
individuals can vote on account of key allegiances 
and in addition other conceivably unimportant 
political contemplations which can anticipate lawful 
military intervention happening in circumstances 
where it is a sensible, important and reasonable 
reaction to the danger postured to international peace 
and security (Musifiky, 2010). 
 This issue is brought most strongly into center 
when such political impasse permits a group of 
terrorist to keep unleashing violence on innocent’s 
powerless citizens or a state to keep executing gross 
human rights violations against its people groups in 
negation of all settled international norms and in 
clear perspective of the international community. 
These circumstances can bring about states making 
unilateral military move outside of the collective 
security framework which undermines the authority 
of international law and results in the international 
community questioning the reason, need and 
adequacy of the collective security framework in the 
cutting edge world request. 
 
The Use of Military Force against non-state actors 
by collective effort of number of states: Legality vs. 
Legitimacy: 
 A standout amongst the most squeezing issues 
confronted by the international community is 
deciding what to do when military force is obliged to 
be taken in light of a danger to international peace 
and security, including where gross human rights 
infringement are being executed by a state or a threat 
pose by cross-border insurgency however the UNSC 
is not able approve military intercession under 
Chapter VII on account of the activity of a veto by a 
permanent part. In such circumstances the utilization 
of military force is legally impermissible and would 
be unlawful if taken. States are confronted with a 
stark decision between doing nothing and agreeing to 
international law or making a move in negation of 
entrenched standards to turn away or stop human 
enduring and restore international peace and security 
(Hickman, 2010). 
 
Application of Force on Non-State Actors in Self 
Defense: 
 There has been expanding discussion in 
international law since the September eleventh 
terrorist assaults with respect to the utilization of 
force against non-state actors (Otto, 2010). In the 
wake of 9/11 the UNSC, interestingly, passed a 
resolution expressing that force could be utilized 
against terrorist groups. This established the 
consensus idea that self-defense can be utilized 
against non-state actors. Whilst there may be 
consensus accord within the international community 
over the utilization of force against non-state actors, 
there is almost no concession as to how this ought to 
be carried out. 
 On the substance of it, utilizing power against 
non-governmental groups or people is not legitimate 
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as the guidelines on power just permit it to be 
utilized against another state. On the other hand, if a 
state is liable to be attack by non-state actors then 
how would they safeguard themselves against it? 
This is a confounded matter, as regardless of the fact 
that the privilege of self-protection were set off, the 
state wishing to practice that privilege would need to 
violate the territorial integrity of another state with 
the view to do as such. In any case, this issue could 
be evaded if the intervening state has the 
authorization of the other state to do as such 
(Buxbaum, 2009). 
 It is additionally essential to note that when 
attacking non-state actors, that whilst it may 
fundamentally violate the jus promotion bellum (the 
law governs when states can resort to warfare), it 
won't naturally rupture the jus in bello (the law that 
governs how warfare is led) given there is a nexus 
between the attack and an armed conflict. This is an 
imperative issue to consider especially as regard to 
the exercise of drone strikes against terrorists 
(Sarkin, 2010). 
 In a few cases, the utilization of force by a non-
state actor can be ascribed to a state and in this way 
the activity of self-protection against that state is 
flawlessly advocated. All together for an activity of a 
non-state actor to be ascribed to a state, that state 
must have effective control over the activities of that 
actor. The importance of effective control was talked 
about in the ICJ Nicaragua judgment. The court 
established that the US had completed an indirect 
utilization of force against Nicaragua because of their 
backing of the rebels. Effective control therefore 
implied that the state being referred to must 
accomplish more than simply fund the non-state 
actor. This is the issue that is becomes an integral 
factor when terrorism is concerned – it has been 
demonstrated before that certain states have financed 
certain terrorist organizations, yet without additional 
proof of effective control, the activities of those 
terrorist organizations can't be credited to that 
state(Newman,2009). 
 The additionally pressing issue is whether a non-
state actor is fit for doing an armed attack within the 
scope of Article. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ set 
out that just the gravest types of armed attack would 
be sufficient to trigger the right to self-protection. Be 
that as it may, since Nicaragua, the likelihood of an 
aggregation of event doctrine has opened up. In the 
Oil Platforms case, the ICJ avowed the high limit for 
an armed attack in Nicaragua and stated that "even 
taken in total" the occasions for this situation would 
not have come to it. This has gathered that there is a 
plausibility that the Court would acknowledge that a 
progression of little scale attacks like terrorist attacks 
could sum to enough to legitimize triggering self-
protection (Hannes, 2013). There is one imperative 
counterargument to this perspective  the entire reason 
for the self-protection doctrine is to permit states to 
safeguard themselves from an ongoing attack, 
however on account of an ongoing terrorist attacks, 
the attacks are ordinarily over before the state can do 
anything in resistance. On the off chance that the 
international community was to acknowledge a 
collection of event doctrine then that would put the 
world in a permanent state of armed attack as a state 
could assert self-defense whenever another terrorist 
attack happens (Hassler, 2010). 
 
Cross border insurgency and paradigm shift in 
sovereignty: 
 This paper argues that contemporary states are 
showing a more prominent willingness to 
acknowledge compromises on matters of sovereignty 
in quest for a more effective counterterrorism 
motivation. States do not appear to be attaching an 
infinite value to sovereignty; yet rather consider it 
within the setting of broader national interest. In this 
way, the degree to which states effectively protect 
their sovereign prerogatives is subject to the same 
system as all other state decisions: the cost-benefit 
analytics. States measure the costs and benefits of 
any given policy or action and utilize the outcome as 
an aide for decision-making. In the present period, 
changing state demeanors with respect to sovereignty 
and counterterrorism emerge from a shifting balance 
between costs and benefits in battling international 
terrorist groups. The ascent of transnational terrorism 
has raised the costs of terrorist action, because of the 
size of damage and disruption that terrorism can 
accomplish and the necessities forced upon states 
intending to make effective and fruitful effort toward 
eradicating cross-border insurgency and terrorism. 
By raising these costs, transnational terrorism has 
provoked a restricted however in any case genuine 
reassessment of the best possible balance between 
sovereignty and counter-terrorism. One of the first 
indications of this reassessment lies with the 
formation of the multi-national joint force among 
countries which allows a cross-border military 
operation thereby compromising some elements of 
traditional concept of sovereignty. 
 Multinational Joint Task Force and the fight 
against Bokoharam: the shifting paradigm of 
sovereignty 
 The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
between Nigeria, Chad and Niger was situated up in 
1998 so as to battle transnational crime in the Lake 
Chad region, however was for the most part 
ineffective until 2012, when it was reactivated so as 
to manage Boko Haram terrorism. So as to control 
the spread of terrorism in the region, the Paris 
Summit of May 2014, which united the presidents of 
Benin, Chad, Cameroon, France, Niger and Nigeria, 
and agents of the US, UK and EU, decided to 
improve regional cooperation in the battle against 
Boko Haram, by method for facilitated patrols and 
border observation, pooling insight and exchange 
pertinent data. In October 2014, the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC) part states (Cameroon, Chad, 
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Niger, and Nigeria) and Benin chose to enhance their 
cooperation to battle Boko Haram, by swearing 
troops to the MNJFT, which ought to have gotten to 
be operational inside national borders by November 
2014. It was additionally chosen to ask the African 
Union (AU) and the UN to set up the proper legal 
structure for cross-border military operations (Daily 
trust 2 August, 2015). 
 Toward the start of 2015, the MNJTF home 
office fell under the control of Boko Haram activists, 
together with the town of Baga in north-eastern 
Nigeria where it was sited (Premium times, 2015). It 
gives the idea that, at that point, just troops from 
Nigeria were positioned there, as Niger and Chad had 
withdrawn their own particular troops due to security 
dangers. It consequently turned out to be 
considerably more critical to resuscitate the regional 
way to deal with battling Boko Haram. On 20 
January, pioneers from 13 West and Central African 
nations (Nigeria was not represented) held talks 
about setting up a multinational power to battle Boko 
Haram, the day after the UN Security Council's 
leader issued an announcement in which it required 
the upgrade of the MNJTF's operational limit(Sahara 
reporters, 27 July 2015). 
 The AU as of late gave the green light to the 
MNJTF through a choice of 29 January 2015 by the 
African Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting 
at the level of heads of state and government. The 
PSC is a standing choice making body of the AU, 
able for peace and security issues. The choice 
approved the sending of the MNJTF, involving up to 
7 500 military and non-military staff, for a starting 
time of 12 months, which can be recharged. The 
mission will expect to make a safe situation, restore 
state power and encourage helpful help with the 
influenced regions. This choice was brought as per 
the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
(Daily trust 2 August, 2015). 
 The MNJTF's more particular undertakings 
incorporate directing military operations, 
accomplishing coordination at between state level, 
leading fringe patrols, discovering kidnapped 
persons, ceasing the stream of arms, reintegrating 
radicals into society and conveying those in charge 
of law violations to equity (Daily trust 2 August, 
2015). In its choice, the PSC additionally asked the 
UN Security Council to receive a determination 
approving the military operation, and also to make a 
trust subsidize and activate universal backing. This 
way would be like that followed in past cases, in 
which the AU sent peace bolster missions (Mali, 
Central African Republic and Somalia); the missions 
were approved and upheld, including through the 
foundation of a trust territory, by the UN Security 
Council(premium times August 6, 2015). The PSC 
choice additionally noticed the need to address the 
improving so as to underlay drivers of the 
emergency, the occupations of the individuals in the 
region. The PSC's position was supported by the AU 
Assembly at the AU's 24th Summit, held in Addis 
Ababa on 30 and 31 January 2015. The Assembly 
communicated its backing for the collective and 
cross-border endeavors sent to battle Boko Haram, 
including for Chad's auspicious intercession in 
Cameroon, and for the dedication of troops by the 
LCBC states and Benin, and the foundation of 




 Against the above background, it is evident that 
Nigeria as sovereign’s nations is willing to 
compromise its sovereignty by allowing the 
neighboring countries to undertake military offensive 
action within its territory primarily because of the 
cost-benefit implication attached to employing such 
strategies in the fight against  transnational terrorism. 
It is therefore implicit from the strategy adopted by 
the country in countering the devastating impact of 
the Bokoharam transnational terrorism that some 
traditional attributes of sovereignty such as the non-
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